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Global Savings and Global Investment:  
The Transmission of Identified Fiscal Shocks†
By James Feyrer and Jay Shambaugh*
This paper examines the effect of exogenous shocks to savings on 
world capital markets. Exogenous tax increases in the United States 
(from Romer and Romer 2010) are only partially offset by changes 
in domestic private savings, and only a small amount is absorbed 
by increased domestic investment (contra Feldstein and Horioka 
1980). Almost half the change in taxes is transmitted abroad 
through a change in the US current account. Other countries experi-
ence decreases in current accounts and increases in investment in 
response to exogenous US tax increases. We cannot reject symmetric 
responses across countries with different currency regimes and levels 
of development. (JEL E21, E22, E23, E62, F32, F42)
Recent discussions of a global savings glut suggest that a surge in savings in one country can have impacts across the globe.1 We wish to examine what happens 
when a dollar of savings is added to world capital markets. If we treat the world 
as a closed economy, undergraduate macroeconomics suggests that an exogenous 
increase in savings results in an increase in investment of equal size. Is this evident 
in the data? Do all countries in the world see an increase in investment or are some 
countries cut off from shocks to world capital markets?
In this paper, we exploit a series of exogenous shocks to US fiscal policy iden-
tified by Romer and Romer (2010) as a starting point to examine the impact of a 
shock to world savings. The Romer shocks are useful because they use analysis of 
the legislative record to identify tax changes that were unrelated to contemporane-
ous economic conditions. The path from a change in US tax policy to world savings 
requires examining a number of interesting questions. Do US tax changes affect 
aggregate savings in the United States? Are changes in US savings exported abroad 
or does all adjustment occur domestically?
1 See Bernanke (2007) for a discussion of the global savings glut hypothesis. The argument posited that an 
oversupply of savings—particularly in Emerging Asia—helped generate a US current account deficit as the savings 
had to flow somewhere, and the United States was the willing recipient of the savings.
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The analysis in this paper is grounded in the national income accounting identi-
ties of the United States and the rest of the world. By definition,
(1)   
_
 y = c( 
_
 y − T ) + i + G + cA,
where output,  
_
 y, is assumed to be determined by the natural rate of output, con-
sumption, c, is a function of disposable income, investment, i, is a function of the 
interest rate in world capital markets, G is government spending, and cA is the cur-
rent account. Savings is what is left over after the private sector and the government 
consume.
(2)  S =  
_
 y − c( 
_
 y − T ) − G.
The relationship between the current account, saving, and investment is
(3)  cA = S − i.
We wish to trace the impact of exogenous changes in taxes through these account-
ing identities. Equation (2) shows that a change to taxes will affect savings through 
private consumption assuming no change to y or G. If agents assume that tax 
changes are permanent, standard models of consumption suggest that a tax increase 
will result in decreased consumption and increased national savings.
Barro (1974) suggests that forward looking taxpayers take into account the gov-
ernment’s long run budget constraint and therefore do not respond to tax changes 
that are unaccompanied by changes in government spending.2 We will refer to this 
private savings response as Ricardian Equivalence for the remainder of the paper.3 
If Ricardian equivalence holds perfectly, tax shocks will be perfectly absorbed by 
changes to private savings and there will be no impact on national savings. Thus, 
we need to test whether national savings in the United States is affected by the tax 
shocks.
Second, are shocks to US national savings transmitted across borders? Equation 
(3) shows that changes to savings must appear either as domestic investment shifts 
or changes to the current account. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) find that savings 
and investment tend to be highly correlated across countries.4 If US savings and 
investment comove perfectly, the shock to US saving will be absorbed domestically 
and not transmitted across the border.
2 Also see Barro (1989). Ricardian Equivalence has generated a considerable literature since Barro’s initial 
article. See Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) and Seater (1993) for some details of the debate.
3 There are many reasons (borrowing constraints, consumption rules of consumers, bequest desires) that we may 
see a failure of private savings to offset a tax shock. In addition, the type of tax shock could lead to different effects. 
We discuss the type of tax shocks in Section II.
4 This result has been updated countless times. See Coakley, Kulasi, and Smith (1998). Obstfeld and Taylor 
(2004) note that the Feldstein and Horioka (1980) correlation has been falling since 1970.
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These two questions combine to determine whether we observe “twin deficits.” 
Are budget deficits linked with current account deficits? If we see an impact of US 
tax shocks on the US current account, this signals that neither private savings offsets 
nor Feldstein-Horioka are fully operational and there is some truth to the view of 
twin deficits.
Once we establish that exogenous shocks to US savings are transmitted abroad 
through the US current account we can begin to take accounting identities seriously 
at the world level. Barring trade with Mars, a shock to the US current account must 
generate an equal and opposite shock to the aggregate current account of the rest of 
the world. Equation (3) tells us that these current account shocks must be accompa-
nied by changes in saving or investment in the rest of the world.
We find that exogenous tax policy changes in the United States have a significant 
impact on investment in other countries over the period 1973–2005. When the US 
changes tax policy for exogenous reasons, a substantial amount of that change in 
policy is transmitted through changes in the current account to the rest of the world. 
When the US government saves more, private citizens do save somewhat less, but 
the impact on national savings is still positive. Further, domestic investment has a 
relatively small response to an exogenous fiscal shock, so the majority of the change 
in savings turns into a change in net lending to or borrowing from the rest of the 
world.
Fiscal shocks in the United States act as shocks to world savings. The response 
of the rest of the world to these shocks appears to be well described by the simple 
closed economy relationship S = i. An exogenous shock to world savings results in 
higher investment around the globe. While there is some suggestion that the mag-
nitude of the response varies across currency regimes or levels of development, we 
cannot reject that all countries have identical responses to the shocks. Interestingly, 
the magnitude of the response seems to be unrelated to standard measures of open-
ness to capital flows.
These results are consistent with a world where shocks to the world capital mar-
ket are transmitted to all countries and all countries share a similar elasticity of 
investment with respect to the world interest rate. Every additional dollar of world 
savings appears as an investment increase in each country in the world proportional 
to their share of world GDP. This is consistent with short run equalization of capital 
returns and is similar to the long run equalization to capital returns found in Caselli 
and Feyrer (2007).
The results suggest that world capital markets are fluid and reach into all coun-
tries in the world. Changes in saving in one country rapidly appear as investment 
increases in all the rest of the countries in the globe. This is important for thinking 
about the importance of East Asian savings over the last decade as well as for evalu-
ating the impact of the large fiscal policy changes currently occurring in the large 
economies in the world.
I. Previous Literature
Much of the literature on fiscal policy transmission rightly focuses on the impact 
of such policy on the country that engages in the fiscal changes. Such work has 
98 AmERicAn EcOnOmic JOURnAL: EcOnOmic POLicy mAy 2012
included examining episodes of defense budget expansion (Ramey 2011, etc.) 
to examine the impact of fiscal changes on consumption and wages. This work 
tends to find output increases with a fiscal expansion, but consumption and real 
wages fall. Further evidence is drawn from short run restriction identified vector 
autoregressions. This work includes Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2007), 
and Mountford and Uhlig (2008). In this work, output rises with a positive fiscal 
shock, but so do real wages and consumption. The recent debate on the impact of 
fiscal policy has often focused on this disagreement.
In our work, we take the changes in tax policy identified by Romer and Romer 
(2010) as exogenous to current economic conditions to be our fiscal shocks. 
Romer and Romer (2010) focus on the changes over time for the economy as 
a whole as well as for investment and other outcomes following a fiscal shock. 
They find that tax increases which are purely exogenous to the economic setting 
are contractionary. They focus on the dynamic response to tax shocks and see 
that GDP, consumption and investment all fall in response to a tax increase, with 
the impact on investment building over time. In further work, they examine the 
response of government expenditures (Romer and Romer 2009). They find that 
even in the long run, government expenditures do not respond strongly to changes 
in taxes—the starve the beast hypothesis does not hold. This result is important 
in the context of our work in that it suggests changes in government taxes are not 
simply offset by changes in spending in which case there would have been no 
impact on government savings.
A number of studies have looked at the international transmission of fiscal shocks. 
There are two main groups of this literature. First, some papers test the direct impact 
of a fiscal shock in one country on the GDP of other countries. This literature is test-
ing the question of whether fiscal policy shocks can act as an “engine of growth” for 
the rest of the world, or whether the shocks are primarily limited to the local country 
(see Bénassy-Quéré and Cimadomo 2006 and Arin and Koray 2005).
A second strand of the literature is more directly related to the twin deficit con-
cept. This literature also relies on accounting identities to show that changes in 
government savings should lead to changes in the current account. Work using cali-
brations tends to support this view, but recent time series econometric evidence has 
failed to find such effects. In particular, both Kim and Roubini (2008) and Corsetti 
and Muller (2008) argue they find evidence of twin divergence not twin deficits. 
That is, they find that fiscal shocks identified through short run restrictions VARs 
(in the same manner as the bulk of the domestic literature) do not generate twin 
deficits, instead, budget deficits lead to real exchange rate depreciations and current 
account surpluses (or no impact). As Kim and Roubini (2008) note, the change in 
government savings appears to go both to changes in private savings and changes 
in investment (crowding out, consistent with Feldstein and Horioka 1980). Corsetti 
and Muller (2008) also examine evidence across countries to see if the persistence 
of the shocks and openness of the economy affect the transmission. They find that 
yes, such factors play a role and the United States has relatively small levels of inter-
national transmission of shocks based on its relatively closed economy.
Related work has considered both the twin deficits and global savings glut argu-
ments. Chinn and Ito (2007) and Gruber and Kamin (2007) have explored the 
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broader determinants of current accounts. Both use panel analysis to determine 
the root determinants of countries’ current account to GDP ratios. Chinn and Ito 
(2007) are supportive of twin deficits, finding coefficients of between 0.2 and 0.5 
on the budget deficit. Gruber and Kamin (2007) find a coefficient of 0.09 on the 
fiscal balance. Neither study has exogenous variation to identify the impact of a fis-
cal change, but instead rely on cross-country differences. Also, both are examining 
medium term determinants, using five-year averages in the panel.
Given that savings in one country can affect investment in another and vice versa, 
barring any exogenous variation, it is difficult for these studies to directly estimate 
a global savings glut relationship. Instead, they look to see if East Asia saves more 
than expected and the United States less. Gruber and Kamin (2007) argue Asia does 
save too much currently, but that this can be explained as a reaction to the East Asian 
crisis. Chinn and Ito (2007) also argue there is too much savings in Asia but note this 
does not appear to be due to a lack of financial development. Both papers argue it is 
unclear why so much of this savings would flow to the United States.
The results, which are skeptical of twin deficits, contrast with a finding in Romer 
and Romer (2010). At the end of their paper, Romer and Romer examine the impact 
of a tax change on exports and imports. They find that exports increase and imports 
decrease, which they view as consistent with a tax increase leading to a drop in inter-
est rates and hence reducing capital inflows. But, they argue, the drop in imports 
may simply be more consistent with a fall in income rather than any open economy 
effects.
We take this observation as a starting point to explore the impact of a change 
in government savings in one country on both the current account and investment 
in other countries. Our paper is unique in bringing different evidence to bear than 
most explorations of twin deficits: exogenous fiscal shocks matching actual policy 
changes. We find that there is in fact evidence along the lines a twin deficit theory 
would predict: changes in government savings are correlated with changes in the 
current account. Thus, we can look at exogenous shocks to taxes in the United States 
as exogenous shocks to savings available to the rest of the world. The next section 
explains those shocks and how we examine the effects. We further expand the lit-
erature by looking not just at the current account of the country with the change, 
but also by examining where the increased savings goes around the world. Thus, 
the paper makes an important contribution to the literature studying how changes in 
savings in one country affect other countries.
II. Methodology
We borrow the shocks from Romer and Romer (2010), limiting ourselves to the 
exogenous fiscal shocks. The construction of the shocks is described in more detail 
in Romer and Romer (2008). They use legislative history to separate out tax changes 
that were made based on attempts to respond to current economic situations from 
those that are exogenous to current economic conditions. Tax changes that are exog-
enous to short run conditions may be motivated by long run goals, such as a desire 
to restore long run budgetary balance or to spur long run growth through lower mar-
ginal rates. They may be motivated by a shift in governing ideology or through the 
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desire to change particular programs such as social security. These changes involve 
a variety of types of tax shocks, including largely changes to personal income taxes 
or payroll taxes, but taxes to capital as well. Thus, a failure to see a perfect offset 
by private savings cannot be interpreted as a strict failure of Ricardian equivalence. 
But, importantly, the failure of private savings to offset these changes does mean 
that national savings has changed.
Crucially, these changes are not aimed at smoothing short run business cycle 
fluctuations. Through examining the narrative record, Romer and Romer argue that 
the tax changes that they identify are exogenous to current or anticipated economic 
situations. There is, for example, no relationship between the shocks and lagged 
GDP growth in the United States (see Figure 1).
The exogeneity is crucial to the Romer and Romer examination of the domestic 
effects of tax changes. It is also crucial to our investigation of the impact of those 
changes on US savings, investment, and the current account. Even if one worries 
that there is some component of endogeneity in these shocks, when we examine 
overseas responses, the changes are even more clearly exogenous. The shocks are in 
no way responses to changes in savings, investment, or general economic circum-
stances in other countries. Romer and Romer (2009) also show that these tax shocks 
are not offset by changes to government spending, the other crucial factor besides 
private savings offsets in allowing the tax shock to be a change to national savings.
We limit ourselves to those shocks in the post Bretton Woods era of the interna-
tional economy. Our reason is that changes in the international financial architecture 
over time arguably make looking at the international economic transmission prior 
to that time less informative for more recent experiences. Further, we begin to lose 
data on current accounts, investment, and other necessary variables for an increas-
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Figure 1. Romer and Romer Fiscal Shocks versus Lagged GDP Growth
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from 1973 to 2005. For the regression on the current account, the dataset is an unbal-
anced panel of 114 countries.5 For every year after 1980 our sample includes more 
than 90 percent of world GDP, rising to over 94 percent after 1990. The investment 
data is somewhat more limiting with only 105 countries. For the current account, 
Kuwait has changes that are greater than aggregate GDP for several years around the 
Gulf War. For this reason, we exclude Kuwait from the dataset.
We explore the impact of the exogenous Romer tax shocks on US variables, 
rest of world variables summed together, and in panels for individual country/year 
observations. We examine the data in terms of changes divided by GDP. That is, 
when we look at the current account, we examine the change in the current account 
divided by the previous year’s GDP. The advantage of scaling to GDP rather than 
simply using raw dollar amounts and controlling for GDP is that when we turn to 
the effects in other countries, we do not have to convert investment into a common 
currency. Instead, we can scale by local GDP.6
By using lagged GDP to scale the changes we are implicitly assuming that GDP 
is unchanged by the shocks. Romer and Romer (2010) find that the impact on output 
is quite small in the first three quarters after the shock. Assuming no output move-
ment is therefore a reasonable assumption during the year of the tax change which 
is our period of interest. More importantly, output effects are likely to bias us against 
finding external effects of US tax changes. If output falls with a tax increase, private 
savings should decrease such that national savings will increase by less than if there 
were no output response. The same bias will hold for the impact of the shocks on 
non-US GDP, and foreign GDP is even less likely to respond to the shocks than 
domestic GDP.7
The shocks themselves are in billions of US dollars and are changes in tax 
policy. That is, a permanent reduction in taxes by 100 billion dollars in 1985 
would show up as a shock of −$100 billion in 1985 and zero thereafter. Thus, 
we are interested in the change in the current account (or investment) in a given 
year. Romer and Romer (2010) typically use a dynamic specification examining 
the impact of policy changes over time. We lack adequate quarterly data for many 
countries to exploit their series higher frequency and use annual data, removing 
part of the interest in fluctuations over time. More importantly, our view is that 
of an accounting identity. We are curious where the changes in savings in a given 
year go. If the government saves more in a given year, where does that money go 
in that given year?
5 The results are consistent if one uses a balanced panel, but doing so requires trimming both years and countries 
from our panel and reduces the statistical power of the results.
6 The current account data are in current dollars and the change is expressed as a percentage of lagged current 
dollar GDP. Investment data are real dollars and the change is expressed as a percentage of lagged real GDP. All 
data are from the World Bank World Development Indicators.
7 If GDP responds contemporaneously, a US tax increase would reduce world aggregate demand and drive 
down investment in the rest of the world. This would bias against finding that US tax increases generate investment 
increases elsewhere.
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III. Results
A. Aggregate Results
Figure 2 shows the crucial motivating fact. The bars represent the exogenous 
shocks to US fiscal policy identified by Romer and Romer (2010). The two lines 
show changes in the US current account and changes in the summation of the cur-
rent accounts for the rest of the world. In order to maintain consistency with the 
tables in the rest of the paper, all changes and shocks are scaled to the level of non-
US world GDP. For the purpose of this graph, the important fact is that the relative 
magnitudes are the same for the shock and for the current account changes.
Exogenous changes in US fiscal policy track reasonably closely with changes in 
the size of the US current account. The simple correlation between the fiscal shocks 
and changes to the US current account is 0.29. The correlation between the shocks 
and changes to the rest of the world’s current account is −0.37. Trade with Mars (or 
missing observations in our dataset in the rest of the world) appears to play a small 
role and the correlation between the movements in the US current account and the 
rest of the world’s current account is −0.77.
Table 1 illustrates the basic facts from Figure 2 more formally. We regress the 
change in the current account divided by lagged GDP on the shock measured as a 
percentage of GDP. The regressions are run with Newey-West standard errors to 
control for possible serial correlation in the time series.8 For the current account, 
the expected change in any given time period is zero so a constant is omitted.9 For 
8 As it turns out Newey-West standard errors, heteroscedasticity robust standard errors, and OLS estimated 
standard errors are all nearly identical. There is very little autocorrelation in either the shocks or the changes in the 
current account.


















1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
US CA                     ROW CA                     Shock
Figure 2. Changes in the US and Rest of World Current Accounts in Response to  
US Fiscal Policy Shocks
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investment, trend growth is positive so a constant is included. Equation (4) shows 
the simple estimating equation.
(4)   y t = α + β ∗ Shoc k t + ε.
What coefficients should we expect to see for the US regressions in Table 1? If 
the United States were a small open economy and government spending, private 
savings, and investment within the United States were completely unresponsive to 
exogenous fiscal shocks we would expect these shocks to translate one for one into 
changes in the US current account. This suggests that we should see a coefficient of 
one in column 1 and a coefficient of zero in column 2.
However, for the response of investment we must remember that the United 
States is not a small open economy. In a typical year in our sample, US GDP is 
roughly 25 percent of total world output. A substantial portion of the shock to US 
savings should therefore show up in US investment even if there were no strong 
tendency of savings and investment to move together (as suggested by Feldstein 
and Horioka 1980). In fact, if capital were perfectly mobile and all countries had 
identical elasticities of investment to movements in the common world interest rate, 
we would expect the US investment increase to be proportional to the US share of 
world GDP.10 The benchmark for the coefficient in the investment regression should 
therefore be roughly 0.25. This in turn suggests that the benchmark for the response 
of the current account in column 1 is 0.75 rather than one.
10 This fact that savings and investment should be more highly correlated in large open economies has been 
noted in the literature going back to Feldstein and Horioka (1980). See Coakley, Kulasi, and Smith (1998) for a 
more complete discussion.
Table 1—The Effect of Exogenous Shocks to US Fiscal Policy on the Current Account and 
Investment in the US and the Rest of the World (ROW)
US CA US Inv ROW CA ROW CA ROW CA-IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fiscal shock/US GDP 0.466** 0.166
(0.190) (0.327)
US CA −0.809*** −1.298***
(0.130) (0.397)




Observations 32 29 32 32 32
R2 0.377
note: Standard errors corrected for serial correlation.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Column 1 shows the response of the US current account to an exogenous fiscal 
shock. The coefficient of 0.466 indicates that for every dollar increase in US taxes 
collected, almost half moves to the rest of the world economy through an increase in 
the US current account. Column 2 shows the response of US investment to the fiscal 
shocks. For every $1 dollar increase in US taxes collected there is a 17 cent increase 
in investment in the United States.11
In neither case can we reject our benchmarks of 0.75 for the current account and 
0.25 for investment. The investment coefficient is not precisely estimated, so the 
confidence interval allows for some degree of saving-investment correlation along 
the lines of Feldstein and Horioka. However, the point estimates suggest no failure 
of capital markets suggested by Feldstein and Horioka. The current account coef-
ficient is somewhat less than 0.75 and the investment coefficient suggests that this is 
not due to correlation between savings and investment. This is consistent with some 
degree of Ricardian Equivalence.12 The point estimates suggest that for every dollar 
of tax increase, about one-third of the tax increase is offset by a decrease in private 
savings. Of the remaining 67 cents, roughly 17 is invested in the United States and 
the rest, or roughly half the shock, is transmitted abroad.13
Columns 3–5 examine the response of the current account in the rest of the world 
to shocks originating in the United States. The left-hand side in these regressions is 
the change in the sum of the value of the current accounts for all countries except 
the United States expressed as a percentage of aggregate GDP summed across all 
countries except the United States. In other words it is the change in the value of the 
non-US current account as a percentage of non-US GDP.
In order to aid in interpreting the coefficients, the right-hand side variables are 
also scaled as a proportion of non-US GDP. For example, column 3 examines the 
response of the rest of the world’s current account to changes in the US current 
account. The change in the US current account is measured as a percentage of non-
US aggregate GDP. As long as the sum of the current accounts of all countries in the 
world is zero (no trade with Mars) this coefficient should be exactly negative one. If 
the US current account increases by 1 percent of non-US GDP, we would expect the 
non-US current account to decrease by 1 percent as a percentage of non-US GDP. 
The actual estimate is −0.81. The coefficient is significantly different from zero at 
the 1 percent level and is not significantly different from negative 1.
Column 4 examines the effect of the fiscal shock on the rest of the world’s cur-
rent account. The fiscal shock is also scaled as a percentage of non-US GDP. In this 
case we do not expect a coefficient of negative one since not all of the shock will 
cross the US border. As we discuss above, the largest response (in absolute value) 
that we expect to see is 0.75, and column 1 suggests that only half of the fiscal shock 
appears as an increase in world savings. Assuming that column 1 is well estimated 
11 Romer and Romer (2010) find that a tax increase is coincident with a drop in investment over time. The con-
temporaneous effect is close to zero. We are using dataset only from 1973 forward at the annual frequency, so the 
slightly different result is not surprising.
12 We are using Ricardian Equivalence here as shorthand for a private savings response to tax changes. It is not 
necessary for us to take a strong position on the mechanisms of this response. We simply need to establish that the 
tax shock results in a movement in the current account.
13 The 17 cents that show up as domestic investment is almost exactly 25 percent of the savings change, match-
ing the US share of world income.
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and that there are no other effects of a US fiscal shock we should expect the coeffi-
cient in column 4 to be negative and of the same size as the coefficient in column 1. 
The estimate of −0.669 is larger in absolute value than the column 1 estimate and 
smaller than our theoretical benchmark and insignificantly different from both. We 
can strongly reject a zero coefficient or no response.
Finally, we can use the fiscal shock as an instrument to establish that exogenous 
changes in the US current account results in equal and opposite changes in the cur-
rent account in the rest of the world. Column 5 regresses the non-US current account 
response to a change in the US current account where the US current account change 
is instrumented with the Romer and Romer exogenous fiscal shocks. In this case, 
accounting identities would once again suggest a coefficient of negative one. The 
point estimate is larger (in absolute value) than one, but unity is well within the 
confidence interval, and once again, we can safely reject no effect.
The results of Table 1 suggest that exogenous shocks to US fiscal policy have an 
impact on other countries, at least in the aggregate. There is a statistically significant 
and economically sensible response of the rest of the world’s current account to a 
US tax law change. A one dollar increase in US taxes results in a 47 cent shock to 
the US current account. Taking the US tax changes as exogenous, this represents an 
exogenous increase of loanable funds to world capital markets. This increase shows 
up as a current account surplus for all other countries in the world.
B. disaggregated Results
What impact does a US tax shock have on a typical country? Suppose that our 
benchmark is to think of the world as comprised of countries that rely on a common 
pool of savings and respond to a common world interest rate. At the world level, 
savings must equal investment, so shocks to US savings should result in increased 
investment through lower world interest rates. As long as investment decisions in 
individual countries are determined by the world interest rate, we should expect to 
see all countries in the world respond to shocks to US savings. If we further assume 
that countries borrow from abroad at the margin and share similar elasticities of 
investment with regard to the world interest rate we should expect to see a propor-
tionally similar response across all countries. Even if countries insulate themselves 
from the world interest rate to some extent via capital controls or have different 
levels of nominal interest rates due to different inflation rates and expected changes 
in exchange rates, as long as the shock to savings and hence world interest rates has 
an impact at the margin of their capital market, we should see some response.
In the tables to follow we move from aggregate results to individual country 
results. One advantage is to allow us to scale local investment by local GDP and 
not have to sum investment across countries (which involves finding plausible inter-
nationally comparable investment price indices). For the initial results, we include 
results where observations are weighted by country size. In these cases, the regres-
sions are similar to the aggregated regressions from the previous section. This has 
the advantage of scaling the coefficients to conform to the accounting identities 
discussed earlier. A one dollar shock to the US current account should show up as 
a one dollar shock to the rest of the world’s current account. The downside to this 
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approach is that the response of large countries will dominate the results. For the 
nonweighted regressions each country is taken as an individual experiment, increas-
ing the power of the regressions. This will also allow us to examine sub-groups 
of countries for differential responses. Do open countries respond to a world sav-
ing shock differently than closed countries? Does the currency regime affect the 
response to shocks? Do shocks differ over levels of development?
Table 2 shows the results from our country level regressions. The regression 
equation being estimated is similar to equation (4) with the addition of country fixed 
effects made possible by the panel structure of the data. The country level effects are 
only included in the regressions on changes to investment. Because of GDP growth, 
the change in investment as a percentage of GDP is positive on average and will vary 
by country based on the growth rate of aggregate GDP. The country effects control 
for this heterogeneity. In the case of the current account, our accounting identities 
suggest that the expected growth rate for any arbitrary observation is zero. In leaving 
out country effects and a constant we are essentially imposing this moment condi-
tion on the current account regressions.14 In all cases, standard errors are clustered 
by year to account for the fact that the shock is identical for all countries in any given 
year.15
(5)   y it = β × Shoc k it +  γ i + ε.
As in Table 1, we expect a coefficient of between −0.47 and −0.75 on the cur-
rent account. If smaller countries typically respond more, the coefficient on the 
unweighted regressions will tend to be larger, with the weighted regressions more 
directly corresponding to the aggregated results.
14 The results do not change substantially if we include a full set of country dummies. When included, the esti-
mates for the country effects are small and typically insignificant.
15 The other potential standard error complication is serial correlation. The aggregate results suggest that this is 
not a significant issue. Clustering on the country level rather than the year level yields much lower standard errors. 
Using multilevel clustering on both year and country (as described in Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2006) yields 
standard errors that are very similar to just clustering by year.
Table 2—The Effect of Exogenous US Fiscal Shocks on Investment and the Current Account
CA CA weight INV INV weight
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fiscal shock −1.640*** −0.576* 1.354** 0.817
(0.512) (0.297) (0.582) (0.553)
Constant 0.006 0.039
(0.016) (0.037)
Observations 3,017 3,017 2,286 2,286
R2 0.003 0.001 0.131 0.150
notes: Investment regressions include a set of country dummies. Standard errors clustered by year.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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The unweighted regression has a clearly larger coefficient and the size implies 
that when the United States increases taxes by 1 percent of world GDP, the typical 
country sees a current account response in excess of 1 percent of its GDP, though 
1 percent is in the confidence interval. For the weighted regression, the response of 
−0.58 is directly between −0.47 and −0.75, quite similar to the aggregate estimate 
of −0.67, and −0.47 is well within the confidence interval. For both the weighted 
and unweighted regressions, zero effect is rejected.
The expected coefficient on investment is less certain. If we believe other coun-
tries current accounts must respond to a change in the US current account simply 
due to an adding up constraint, the open question is whether the change in the cur-
rent account is accomplished by a change in investment or savings abroad. Thus, we 
might expect a coefficient of roughly the same size (but opposite sign) for invest-
ment (since cA = S − i ) if there is no savings response but a smaller response if 
savings moves.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 suggest that the current account shocks are absorbed 
through changes to investment, not savings. The investment response is always close 
to the absolute value of the current account response. A US fiscal shock of 1 per-
cent of non-US world GDP is accompanied by roughly the same size increase in 
investment abroad. As with the current account regressions, the coefficient for the 
unweighted regression is larger than the weighted regression, but the gap is not 
substantial.
A slightly different way to look at the same question is directly through the cur-
rent account. Table 3 shows the result of using the exogenous fiscal shock as an 
instrument for shocks to the current account, similar to column 5 of Table 1. In 
columns 1 and 2, the change in the current account as a percentage of own country 
GDP is regressed against the changes in the US current account divided by GDP in 
the rest of the world. The US current account change is instrumented with the exog-
enous fiscal shock. In columns 3 and 4, the change in investment at the country year 
level is regressed against the change in the current account at the country year level 
with the current account change instrumented using the US fiscal shock.
Table 3 is similar to Table 2 with the coefficients rescaled to more closely match 
the accounting identities. Since the sum of the world’s current account must be zero, 
we expect the coefficient on the weighted regression in column 2 to be negative one. 
For investment, a coefficient of negative one in the weighted regressions indicates 
that the current account shock is completely absorbed by investment with no change 
in savings.16 These are roughly the values that we observe. For the average country 
we see highly statistically significant responses in the current account when US fis-
cal shocks are used to instrument US current account movements. For the average 
country we see statistically significant responses in investment to domestic current 
account movements that are caused by US fiscal shocks.
16 Note that the sign of the investment coefficients is flipped compared to the reduced form in Table 2 because 
the right-hand-side variable is now the domestic current account. In Table 2, the coefficients are the response of 
investment to a world savings shock. In Table 3, the coefficients represent the response of investment to a domestic 
current account shock. These will run in opposite directions.
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Exogenous fiscal shocks in the United States appear to cause movements in the 
US current account which cause changes to investment in the rest of the world. In 
the next section we move to smaller samples of the data to examine whether there 
is heterogeneity in how countries are affected by the shock. In particular we will 
examine whether levels of development, currency regimes, or levels of financial 
openness affect the size of the response to US fiscal shocks.
C. does the Shock Affect countries Symmetrically?
Table 4 shows the results broken up by level of development where the advanced 
countries are the original OECD countries, the emerging countries are the countries 
in the EMBI index along with much of Eastern Europe, and the developing countries 
are all other countries.17 For the current account, the response to US fiscal shocks 
appear to be decreasing in levels of development, though one cannot reject that all 
three groups have identical coefficients. For investment, the emerging group appears 
to have the largest response, but again one cannot reject that all three groups are 
identical. Perhaps more interesting than the pattern of results is the fact that coun-
tries at all three levels of development have a significant response to the US shocks 
to world savings (significant for the Advanced and Developing samples for the cur-
rent account and for the Emerging sample in investment) and that the magnitudes 
of these results are very similar across levels of development. Initially, one might 
think that large advanced nations have such deep capital markets that outside fiscal 
shocks would be moot, but one must consider the global savings glut argument that 
an increase in savings abroad affects a country even as large and financially deep 
as the United States. In that context, it may not be surprising that US shocks spill 
across all types of nations.
Table 5 shows the results broken down by currency regime. The currency regime 
is categorized across two dimensions. First, are countries dollar based or nondollar 
17 See Table A1 in the Appendix for a full list of countries in each category.
Table 3—The Effect of Current Account Shocks—IV
CA CA weight INV INV weight
(1) (2) (3) (4)
US CA change/world GDP −3.041*** −1.113***
(1.028) (0.341)




Observations 3,017 3,017 2,286 2,286
R2 0.028
notes: Investment regressions include a set of country dummies. Standard errors clustered by year.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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based and second, are they pegged or are they nonpegged. We use the coding from 
Shambaugh (2004) for both measures. The base country is the country to which a 
nation pegs or if it is not pegged in a given year, the country to which it pegs when 
it does peg. Given that nearly every country pegs at some point in the sample, the 
base country is directly revealed. In questionable cases, the history of the currency 
and behavior of nearby countries can be used as a guide. Countries are considered 
pegged if they stay within 2 percent bands against their base currency throughout the 
year or if they have a perfectly flat exchange rate except for a one time devaluation.18
The results suggest that dollar-based economies have a larger response to both the 
current account and investment compared to non-dollar-based economies. Pegged 
countries have a somewhat larger response than nonpegged countries. Dollar-based 
pegs have the largest response for both variables and it is only for the dollar-based 
countries that we can reject no effect in the investment regression. While this varia-
tion seems reasonable, none of these differences is significant. It may be that dollar-
based and dollar pegged countries are more tied to the US capital market and hence 
feel the impact of US tax shocks more directly, but in general, the coefficients are 
within range of one another, so no definitive statements can be made. The only 
significantly different coefficient is that nondollar nonpegs show effectively zero 
response in investment, but that coefficient is imprecisely estimated and we cannot 
reject zero or one or negative one for that matter.
Table 6 shows the variation in responses across financially open and closed econ-
omies. In this table, we use the binary measure of the IMF’s annual yearbook to clas-
sify countries (aggregating the disaggregated measures into a binary classification 
after 1995 for continuity). Closed economies appear to have a larger response in the 
current account but a smaller response to investment. The standard errors are fairly 
high across groups leaving the differences insignificant. The results, though, do 
18 See Klein and Shambaugh (2009) for an extensive discussion of the different ways to code a country’s 
exchange rate regime.
Table 4—Responses by Level of Development
Current account
All Advanced Emerging Developing
Fiscal shock −1.640*** −0.802* −1.499 −1.993***
(0.512) (0.469) (1.025) (0.606)
Observations 3,017 651 623 1,743
R2 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.003
Investment
All Advanced Emerging Developing
Fiscal shock 1.254** 0.573 1.686** 1.380
(0.610) (0.552) (0.666) (0.882)
Observations 2,587 634 563 1,390
R2 0.131 0.024 0.062 0.149
notes: Investment regressions include a set of country dummies. Standard errors clustered by year.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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not change substantially if one uses continuous measures developed by Quinn and 
Toyoda (2008) or Chinn and Ito (2006)19 to divide countries into groups. It seems 
odd that even countries that nominally have capital controls are affected by changes 
in US tax policy, but few countries with capital controls truly shut off access to capi-
tal markets. Instead, they tend to temper price signals or simply slow capital flows. 
19 Also see Chinn and Ito (2008).






Fiscal shock −1.640*** −1.844*** −1.305*
(0.512) (0.656) (0.668)
Observations 3,017 1,869 1,148
R2 0.003 0.004 0.002
Pegs
Fiscal shock −1.859** −1.995* −1.701
(0.706) (1.128) (1.014)
Observations 1,309 671 638
R2 0.002 0.003 0.002
Non pegs
Fiscal shock −1.456** −1.749** −0.809
(0.706) (0.827) (0.560)
Observations 1706 1198 508
R2 0.004 0.004 0.003
Investment
All
Fiscal shock 1.254** 1.732** 0.550
(0.610) (0.756) (0.835)
Observations 2,587 1,564 1,023
R2 0.131 0.057 0.199
Pegs
Fiscal shock 1.427+ 1.808** 1.090
(0.769) (0.825) (1.258)
Observations 1,057 525 532
R2 0.207 0.140 0.232
Non pegs
Fiscal shock 1.061 1.593* 0.030
(0.655) (0.847) (0.734)
Observations 1,530 1,039 491
R2 0.079 0.085 0.066
notes: Investment regressions include country dummies. Standard errors clustered by year.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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In fact, a number of studies suggest that capital controls do not substantially alter the 
volume of capital flows for a country (though they may alter the composition).20 In 
that context, we may not be surprised to see similar responses across different types 
of financial openness measures.
In fact, all that is needed to have symmetric responses across different country 
types is marginal lending from world markets and similar elasticities of investment 
with regards to world interest rates across countries. This is consistent with the con-
clusion of Caselli and Feyrer (2007) which shows that financial returns to capital 
are roughly equalized across countries. If returns are equalized at the margin, this 
suggests that shocks should transmit across all countries in a similar fashion. This is 
largely what we observe.
IV. Conclusion
This paper takes a straightforward approach to examining the transmission of fis-
cal shocks across borders using accounting identities. We view changes in tax policy 
as a change in government savings. Assuming that change in savings is not entirely 
offset by either private savings or investment, the current account should respond to 
such a shock. If the home current account changes, the foreign must as well. A tax 
shock in one country should therefore lead to changes in either savings or invest-
ment (or both) in other countries.
Using exogenous tax policy shocks in the United States developed by Romer and 
Romer (2010), we find that when US taxes increase, a substantial (roughly half) por-
tion of that increase in savings is transmitted to the current account. That increase in 
the US current account is mirrored in a current account deficit abroad. There appears 
20 See, for example, a number of papers in Edwards (2007). In particular, the chapters by Magud and Reinhart 
(2007) makes the point directly, but other country studies suggest the same result.
Table 6—Responses by Financial Openness
Current account
All Open Closed
Fiscal shock −1.640*** −0.750 −2.015***
(0.512) (1.063) (0.593)
Observations 3,017 749 2,084
R2 0.003 0.001 0.004
Investment
All Open Closed
Fiscal Shock 1.254** 1.621** 0.999
(0.610) (0.740) (0.615)
Observations 2,587 729 1,857
R2 0.131 0.091 0.156
notes: Investment regressions include country dummies. Standard errors clustered by year.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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to be little change in foreign savings. Instead, investment abroad moves nearly one 
for one with the current account. Thus, fiscal contraction through tax increases may 
lead to increased investment abroad. The result is novel both in itself and due to the 
approach through which it is reached. Due to the intertwined nature of savings and 
investment around the globe, previous work studying the change in savings in one 
country has not been able to identify the impact on other countries’ investment.
One might expect that if a large country increased taxes, that fiscal contraction 
may act as a drag on the world economy. But, if that increase in savings also increases 
investment in other countries, such an effect may be mitigated. In a domestic con-
text, we tend to think one reason a tax cut does not purely crowd out investment is 
the ability to borrow from abroad. In the global context, though, the world economy 
is closed, so a change in taxes has a substantial impact on investment.
Along the way to this important result, the paper has implications for a num-
ber of important theories. The fact that a tax policy change affects the US current 
account suggests that tax policy changes are not directly offset by private savings 
behavior, nor do saving and investment move together (in contrast to the Feldstein 
Horioka result). Our results also suggest that the notion of twin deficits appears 
sensible despite some recent econometric evidence to the contrary. Most of all, 
though, our results suggest that savings shocks in one country affect investment 
around the globe.
The implications for today’s world are important. According to these results, tax 
cuts in one country will lower the pool of savings available for investment around 
the globe. We caution that our identification is from tax changes that are exogenous 
with respect to current economic conditions. This is clearly not the case with fiscal 
policy in 2009–2011. It may be that the short run response to changes in fiscal policy 
is very different in periods of slack aggregate demand and near zero short term inter-
est rates compared to an economy operating at the natural rate of output. Ultimately, 
however, the economy will be operating at or near the natural rate and the account-
ing identities continue to hold.
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